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Introduction
The United States is an influential superpower with military, political and economic
prominence throughout the world. Since the Spanish American War of 1898, the US has been the
hegemonic power in the western hemisphere. Because of its strong influence, US military
involvement in other countries is highly scrutinized both internationally and domestically.
During the Cold War, the US perceived that Latin America had a weakness towards communism.
Therefore, US military interventions were justified as actions for preventing conununism and for
promoting democracy. Intervention used to further US objectives can be military actions,
economic trade or coercive diplomacy, such as when the US threatens to suspend economic
assistance to its poorer allies. Is US intervention effective in promoting democratic practices in
Latin American governments?
Latin American nations have not had much international power or influence;
nevertheless, they have been subject to many US interventions. Why, then, has the US bothered
to intervene in the political systems of small, generally poor countries in Latin America?
According to Paul Drake, in the 20th century, US attitudes of etlmocentrism and racism
influenced the decision to intervene in "weaker, darker, poorer countries" (Lowenthall991, 7).
Essentially, the perceptions ofthe US ofthe people of Latin America were viewed as not being
able to govern themselves and needed the guidance of the US. Also, in what the US refers to as
"American's backyard", the Caribbean Basin holds US strategic and economic advantages that
improve US security.
From 1948 to the end ofthe Cold War against the communist Soviet Union in 1990, the
US put more focus on its national security, acting on the alleged threats of communism in Latin
America. The US accomplished this by removing presidents who were susceptible to
1

communism and by supporting authoritarian regimes that were anti-communist. '1l1ough the main
purpose was to contain communism, many interventions were justified as also promoting
democracy in the Western Hemisphere.
Generally, US interventions in Latin America have been primarily motivated by US
national security needs. The possibility of Soviet nuclear weapons, troops and bases in close
proximity of the US mainland would have been detrimental to the safety and protection of the
US and its citizens. Armed conflict and the deployment of military persolUlel arc generally,
unpopular among the people of the US. A positive justification by US leaders, such as promoting
democracy, builds support within their constituencies. Does US military intervention and
coercive diplomacy actually result in the establishment of stable Latin American democracies, or
is national security the only aim of US action?
Democracy is more than holding elections to elect government officials. To have a true
democracy, all constituents must have the opportunity to vote, run for office and voice their own
opinions without the fear of retribution (Smith 2005, 8). Also, those who were elected to power
must peacefully relinquish their positions when the time comes.
When it comes to promoting democracy abroad, US officials see themselves as "the
guardians and promoters of a set of moral principles" (Herrick and McRae 2003, 2). Such moral
pri nciples referred to by Herrick and McRae are the promotion of democracy and respect for the
law. When those without our morals and values come into a position of power threatening our
own, the US is motivated to intervene. Although US intervention is to protect US interests and
national security, it is also a quest to promote democracy.
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My hypothesis is that US intervention is elTective in promoting democratic practices in
Latin American goverrunents. Types of intervention for this study are direct military intervention
and indirect intervention as was the case in Nicaragua.
The Dominican Republic (1965), Panama (1989) and Nicaragua (1979) will be used to
test my hypothesis. These particular countries were chosen because of US president's statements
citing the need to promote democracy and to gain an understanding of US foreign policy in the
region. The government prior to the intervention and 12 years after the invention will be
analyzed. The core stated goals of US foreign policy will be examined and why the spread of
democracy is beneficial to the US as stated by US foreign policy makers. Although the US has
intervened in Latin America in many different ways, through this research, I hope to gain an
understanding if military intervention is an effective way of promoting democracy.

Literature Review
According to Dinorah Azpuru and Carolyn M. Shaw, the relationship between the US
and Latin Ameri can prior to 1948 was mainly based on economic benefits for the US (Azpuru
and Shaw 2010, 253). Democratic promotion was not a high priority and the US supported
authoritarian governments if it was in the best of interests of national security (Azpuru and Shaw
2020, 253). As a capitalist nation, the US is interested in promoting its domestic business and
foreign trade. The financial prosperity of the US is vital for maintaining its dominant position in
the world. And US trade with Latin America, from an economic perspective, can be mutually
beneficial. Free trade between the US and Latin America secures markets by giving both
countries a common interest in each other's success. According to the authors, democracy is
promoted in Latin America through trade with the United States because it encourages
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individuals to succeed, businesses to thrive, and empowers employees economically with good
jobs.
In Understanding Central America: Global Forces, Rebellion and Change, Jolm A.
Booth, Christine J. Wade, and Thomas W. Walker write that U.S. national security became a
priority in I.atin America during the Cold War (2006, 177). The US was concerned that the
Soviet Union would spread conununism and extend their influence into Latin America, curtailing
U.S. control in their own backyard. According to Booth, Wade and Walker, national security
and stopping the spread of communism "was the major force driving U.S. policy'' during the
Cold War with the Soviet Union (Booth, Wade, and Walker 2006, 178). This strategy was
known as containment. The main purpose of containment was to stop the spread of Latin
American governments supporting the Soviet Union. According to the authors, it wasn't until
after the Cold War and the perceived threat of communism diminished that the US was interested
in promoting democracy in Latin America (Booth, Wade and Walker 2006, 202).
According to Peter H. Smith, In Talons ofthe Eagle: Dynamics of U.S. -Latin American
relations, it is the political mission of the US to spread democracy throughout the world (Smith
2000, 38). Smith contends that throughout history "imperial powers justified their actions in
terms of a higher mission'' (Smith 2000, 39). US imperialism and interventions in Latin America
were justified as promoting the spread of democracy (Smith 2000, 38). More democratic
governments in the Western Hemisphere would increase the likelihood of success for US foreign
policy goals. If there is a worthy purpose, such as the principle of democracy, the use of military
intervention or coercive diplomacy is more acceptable to members of congress and the US
general population.
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In The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century, Samuel P.
Huntington contends that three waves of democratization have occurred in the world ( 1991, 15).
Huntington states that democratization involves: 1): the end of an authoritarian regime 2): the
installation of a democratic regime and 3): the consolidation of the democratic regime
(Huntington 1991, 3 5). The first two waves of democratization were followed by a reverse wave,
in which the countries that had previously transitioned to a democratic government reve1tcd back
to nondemocratic rule (Huntington 1991, 16).
US victories in World War II provided opportunities to increase American global influence,
and focus US interests on national security. Also, after battling a totalitarian superpower,
American policy makers could see the definite need to promote democracy and other American
ideals worldwide.
Scholars such as, Scan M. Lynn·Jones argues the spread of democracy is beneficia] to the US
for the following reasons (Lynn-Jones 1998, 9):

1. Democracies will not go to war with the United States.
Known as the democratic peace theory, the concept promotes the idea that democracies
never (or rarely) go to war with each other (Layne 1994, 8). This does not mean that democracies
do not go to war at all, but democracies do not threaten or fight other democratic regimes. The
more democratic regimes worldwide, the fewer conflicts the US will have to engage in.
Therefore, enhancing the national security of the US and creating a more peaceful world.
2. Democracies don't support terrorism against the United States.

5

The September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center in New York City
and Pentagon in Washington D.C. brought a new sense of insecurity to the US. Then US
President George H.W. Bush initiated a global war on terrorism and against those who wanted to
harm 1he US and US allies (Smith 2005, 341). Lynn-Jones contends terrorists often come from
authoritarian regimes and not democracies. Authoritarian regimes arc severely limited in political
participation. These organizations combined with poverty, unemployment and anti- US
ideologies, produce the perfect govemment for terrorists. For that reason, the spread of
democracy affects US national security by minimizing the number of terrorists in authoritarian
regimes.

3. Democracies produce fewer refugees.

Thousands of refugees escaping from political oppression, ethnic or religious conflicts
often flee to the US in search of a more stable and secure life. For example, many Cubans risk
their lives each year to escape poverty and oppression imposed by Dictator fidel Castro. LynnJones argues that the more democracies world-wide, the number of refugees that immigrate to
the US will be reduced (1998, 9).

4. Democracies wm ally with the United States.
The international spread of democracies promotes American interests by creating more
allies ior the US (1998, 9). Even though the US has a strong military, in times of war, allies are
able to provide the US with strategic, military and economic support. In return, allies also gain
invaluable military, foreign assistance and trade support of the US.

5. American ideals flourish when others adopt them.

6

The US has a genuine interest in seeing its ideals spread. Lynn-Jones argues that the
advantages of American ideals spreading is that the American democracy "will be healthier
when other nations adopt similar political systems" (1998, 9). As the US promotes democracy in
other nations, the US has a sense of self-satisfaction of being able to spread its democratic
principles.
6. Democracies make better economic partners.
As a capitalist nation, the US is interested in pursuing relationships with nations that will
enhance the US's prosperity. In most cases democracies are politically stable and have strong
market economies. Market economies, are run by citizens and businesses and must be free from
government influence. Therefore, an economy may not flourish under an authoritarian regime
where the economy is Wlder tight control.
Several studies indicate that democracy docs not always result from US military
intervention. For example, according to the Congressional Research Service report for Congress
Democracy Promotion: Cornerstone of US Foreign Policy?, the promotion of democracy has
potential downsides. For example, democracy promotion can have a destabilizing effect on the
entire country (CRS 2007, 10). During the transition process, the country can become unstable
and susceptible to attacks from neighboring countries. A 2005 Harvard study stated that "our
research shows that incomplete democratic transitions-those that get stalled before reaching the
stage of fu ll democracy-increase the chance of involvement in international war in countries
where governmental institutions are weak at the outset of the transition" (Mansfield and Snyder
2005, 4). Ultimately, the authors claim that democracy promotion will lead to war and not a
democratic government.
7

The Congressional Research Service report for Congress also contends that a potential
downside of democracy promotion is the high financial cost (CRS 2007, 9). Foreign aid, military
intervention, and diplomacy all require a substantial amount of money. US constituents are
skeptical about foreign actions that are not guaranteed that a democratic government will be
achieved.
In Resolved: That the United States Should Intervene in Another Nation's Struggle for
Democracy, Sidharth Oberoi contends that democracy promotion constitutes as an act of
imperialism (20 11, 12). The author argues that US foreign policy makers arc invading other
countries merely for the benefit of the US. Also, the new government will be devoid of
legitimacy, as the government was forced upon them.
On the other hand, there are also many studies which indicate that US military
intervention is effective in promoting democratic governments. James Meernik conducted a
study which examined why the US intervenes in the affairs of others to promote democracy and
if the usc of force is an effective tool in promoting democratic change. The sample population
consisted oftwenty seven international countries, which involved a U.S. military intervention.
Meernik focused on tlu-ee time periods to analyze, which included 3- Year Pre and Postintervention differences, 3- Year Post-Intervention Difference and 1- Year Post Intervention
Difference. Meemik codes the results as the following: negative changes are coded as -1, no
change as 0 and positive changes as 1.
Based upon his findings, Meernik contends that the US is interested in promoting
democratic change to "bring greater stability in one's region and make it easier to influence the
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targeted nation" (Meernik 1996, 392). Thus, the US is interested in more than promoting
democracy, but also to gain the ability to influence a nation's policy.
Also, Meenik found that U.S. military interventions generally do not promote democratic
changes (Mccrnik 1996, 395). However, Meernik does argue that nations that have U.S.
involvement have a better chance of moving towards democracy compared to nations that have
not experienced US intervention (Meernik 1996, 396). There are many factors that the US can
contribute to countries democratization. For instance, the US has the financial ability to invest in
the economy of a nation to help economic development.
As seen in table one, Meemik's overall results showed there was an increase in
democracy one year post US intervention in the Dominican Republic. However, three years post
US invention showed there was no change in democracy. Nicaragua showed there was no
increase in democracy one year post intervention, with an increase in democracy three years after
the intervention. Nevertheless, Panama showed an increase in all three time periods after the
interventions (Mccrnik 1996, 396).
The majority of the 27 nations studied had no democratic change at all. Despite
Meernik's claim that most nations retain their current level of authoritarian or tyrannical regimes
after a U.S. military intervention, there are limits to his study. First and foremost, his study only
focuses on 27 countries. A larger sample must be used to achieve a more accurate portrayal to
determine if U.S. interventions can result in a more democratic nation. Secondly, Meemik
examines the democratic growth of a country only three years post intervention. Democratic
growth is a slow process, especially if the country has no democratic history to leam from.
Ample time must be given to a country to fully implement the democratic process.

9

Despite Meernik)s results that most of the countries retained their cmrent level of
democracy, he contends that countries are more prone to democratic tendencies with US
intervention (Meernik 1996, 397). Although these results seem contradictory, he clearly states
"that when comparing the progress of democracy in nations which did experience US
intervention with those which did not, the former group boasts greater movement toward
democracy'' (Meernik 1996, 396).
Therefore, my hypothesis that U.S. military interventions and coercive diplomacy can
result in stable democracies are confirmed by Meernik's study. While US military intervention
docs not lead to democracy is every situation, a country is more likely to experience democracy
when it has experienced intervention, compared to countries that had not experienced US
intervention.
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Table l. US Military Interventions and Their Effects on Democratic Change

Year

Event Description

1950
1951
1954
1954
1957
1958
1958
1959
1961
1964
1964

Korean War
Security of Yugosla\'ia
Guatemala Gets USSR Anns
Tachen Islands Fighting
Syria Coup and Crisis with USA
Invasion of Lebanon
Quemoy and Matsu Crisis
Laos Civil War
Congo Civil War
Panama Riots
Fighting on Cyprus
laos Rightist Coup
Congo Civil War
Vietnam War
Dominican Republic Civil War
Civil Disorder in Trinidad
Jordan Civil War with PLO
Cyprus Military Coup
Angola Rebels Invade Zaire
f:-cuadoriPcru Fighting
Problems with Sinai Transition
Security of Honduras
US Marines in Lebanon
US Invasion of Grenada
Nicaraguan Civil War
US Invasion of Panama
Invasion of Kuwait

1964
1964
1964

1965
1970
1970
1974
1978
1981
1982
1982
1982
19&3
1988
1989
1990

J. Ycar Pre and
Post-I ntcrvcntion
Diffcr('nce

J. Year Post·
Intervention
DiiTercnce

J. Year Post·
Intervention
Difference

0

0
I

0
I
-I
0
-1

-)
-I

-I
0
0

0
-I
0
0
I
I

0
0

0
I
0

0
-I

0
0

0
0
I
0

I
0
0
0

0

0

I

0

l

0
0
0
0
0

0

0

I
I

I

0

I
I

I
I
0

I
0

n= 27.
- I =Decrease in democracy, 0= no change, I =increase in democracy.
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0
0
0
I
0
0
0
-I

0
I
0
0
I
0
0
I
0
0
I

Targcl
Nation

South Korea
Yugoslavia
Guatemala
Taiwan
Syria
Lebanon
Taiwan
Laos
Congo
Panama
Cyprus

laos
Congo
South Vietnam
Dominican Republic
Trinidad
Jordan
Cyprus

I

Zaire
Ecuador
Egypt
Honduras
Lebanon
Grenada
Nicaragua
Panama

0

Kuwair

0

Margaret G. Hennrum and Charles W. Kegley Jr. conducted a study that examined the
success of US military interventions in promoting democracy. Eighty nine worldwide cotmtries
which experienced US military interventions between 1945 and 1992 were used to test their
hypothesis that military intervention can lead to democratic institutions. Sixty four of these
interventions included some type of military commitment, whi ch ranged from sending military
advisors to deploying large numbers of troops. Twenty of these interventions, which is the
control group, involved military personnel, but the intervention was not intended to advance
democracy in the targeted nation (Hermann and Kegley 1997, 94).
To determine if there was a negative or positive change to a country's democratic level,
the mean degree before and after an intervention was measured. The Polity III democracy and
autocracy scales designed by Ted Robert Gurr and Keith Jaggers were used to "assess the
competitiveness and regulation of political participation in government, the openness and
competitivess of executive recruitment and the degree of constraint on the chief executive"
(Hermann and Kegley, 1997, 95).
In the Polity III study, to determine the level of democracy, Gurr and Jaggers evaluated
the country based upon their: 1): competitiveness of political participation 2): regulation of
political participation 3): competitiveness of executive recruitment 4): openness of executive
recruitment and 5): constraints on chief executive (Jaggers and Gurr 1995, 472). A score of 0
indicated a low democracy, while 10 was considered a high democracy (Jaggers and Gurr 1995)
472).
T he Hermann and Kegley study confirms my hypothesis that US military interventions
and coercive diplomacy can promote democracy. The authors contend that US interventions have
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more often worked towards enlarging democratic governments, rather than restricting democracy
(Hermann and Kegley 1997, 108).
Also, they state that "the purpose of the intervention, however, helped define the
direc6on of any change that occurred, whether toward becoming more or less democratic"
(Hermann and Kegley 1997, 98). For example, if the US government had a stated goal of
promoting democracy, the US intervention was more likely to result in a democratic government.
Hermann and Kegley focused on the time period directly after the intervention, which is a
limitation of this study. To get a more accurate portrayal of whether or not democracy was able
to withstand the test oftime, at least ten years after the intervention should be researched.

13

Table 2. Etiect of Reform- Oriented Interventions on Democraticness of Target

Means and t· Tests
Mean Mean
N Before Arter

p

Type of Intervention

Reform Interventio~

64 ' -1.50 -0.62 L98 0.03

Intervention Not

Focused on Refonn

25

-3.20 -3.84 -1.4J ns

Analysis of Variance
s~mof

Between Interventions
Type of Intervention
Error
Within Interventions
Change in Democraticness
Change by Type Interaction

Error

Mean
p

Squares

df

Square

217.14

I

5242.98

87

217.14 3.60 0.06
60.26

0.50 1
20.63 I
455.38 87

0.50 0.09 ns
20.63 3.94 0.05
5.23

14

F

Laos
South Vietnam
Thailand
India
Haiti
South Korea
South Vietnam
Panama
Cambodia
Laos
North Vietnam
Dominican Republic
South Korea
Thailand
Cambodia
Laos

1963

1963 *
1963**
1963*
1963•
1963
1964*

1963**

1973

1964
1964**
1964
1964
1965
1965

1964
1969
1968 **
1975 •*
1967*
1969
1975
1974*
1974*

1961

1961
1962
1962

1963

1966
1969**
1969

15

Laos
South Vietnam
Thailand
Cambodia
Guyana
Iran
Nicaragua
Lebanon

1973
1975 **
1975

1975

1973 ...

1975
1979*

1978
1980

1975
1975

1981

1980
1988

1982

1982

Lebanon

1982

El Salvador
Italy

1983 ••
1985

1984
1989*
1986*

Philippines
Libya

1985

1988

1986

1986

Honduras

1986

1988

Bolivia

1986
1987
1988

1987*
19&7
1988
1989*
1990

Guatemala
Honduras
Panama
Nicaragua.
Panama
El Salvador
Liberia
Panama
Iraq

Kuwait
Somalia

1988
1989
1989
1989
1990
1990
1991
1991
1991

1990 **
1991

1991*
1991*
1991

1991
1991
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Methodology
Independent Variable: US intervention
US intervention is not limited to the deployment of military personnel, the use of
surrogates and/or supporting insurgents against the standing government. Intervention can also
be economic, such as installing economic sanctions, cutting off fore

ign aid with the intent

to challenge and/or change the current regime and replace it with a govenunent more acceptable
to the US. For this study US military intervention will include direct military invasion, indirect
military intervention through the use of surrogates and/or threats of the use of the military such
as "gunboat" diplomacy.

Dependent Variable: Promoting Democ•·acy in Latin America
Democracy is a term that is widely used in the political world, but many times is not
completely tmderstood. There are many disputes as to what is considered a true democracy.
Therefore, it is important to define democracy. For this research I will be using the definition as
termed by Robert Dahl. According to Robert Dahl (Smith 2005, 8) there must be eight minimum
requirements for a government to be considered democratic. These democratic values include:
l.

Freedom to form and join organizations

2.

Freedom of expression

3.

The right to vote

4.

Eligibility for public office

5.

The right of political leaders to compete for support and votes

6.

Alternative sources of information
17

7.

free and fair elections

8.

Institutions for making government policies depend on votes and other expressions of

preference (Smith 2005, 8).

Indicators
For the purpose of this study, I will use free and fair elections, the ability of the
opposition to win elections, freedom of expression, freedom to form and join organizations and
the availability of alternative sources of information as indicators of democracy. Another
measure of democracy can be determined if a party or group that takes power relinquishes their
position and if the winners of the later elections turn over power as well (Huntington 1991, 266).
Known as the two-turnover test, surrendering power is an essential part of the democratic
process.
On paper, a democracy can easily be written. However, a functional and stable
democracy does not occlU' overnight, especially in a nation that has been dominated by a

tyrrumical government for decades. It is a practice that must be continually nurtW"ed and allowed
to take effect. Therefore, 1 will focus on twelve years after the intervention to determine ifthere
was democratic change. Nevertheless, I will use a longer period of time in the case of the
Dominican Republic as democracy developed very strong there.
This research study will use Most Similar Systems (MSS) method to gather information
regarding the Dominican Republic, Nicaragua and Panama. According to Timothy C. Lim, it is
important when using MSS to compare at least two systems that share a plethora of similarities
such as political, social or cultural qualities (Lim 2006, 34). Similarities in these particular case
studies include US military interventions, all the countries were ruled by dictators and each had
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slrong authoritarian roots as they were all colonized by absolutist Spain. Also, primary and
secondary sources were used to gather information.

Limitations of the Study
As with any research technique, there are limits of the MSS method. For instance,

examining a small number of cases limits the amount of information that can be gathered (Lim
2006, 38). Therefore, one cannot make large claims from the small number of case studies that
are examined. Another limitation of MSS is that no two countries are exactly alike (Lim 2006,
38). Although countries may share many similarities, there are many differences that must be
taken into account. Differences may include the culture, the economy of a country or if there is a
prior history of democracy. Despite the similarities of the Dominican Republic, Nicaraguan and
Panama, the countries are diverse politically, economically and socially

Dominican Republic
Political repression and lack of democracy increased in the Dominican Republic during
the rule of Dictator Rafael L. Trujillo. From 1930 until his assassination in 1961, Trujillo
severely limited political and civil rights (Crandall 2005, 48). To maintain control over the
nation, Trujillo created his own political party Partido Dominicano (PD), which gave him the
power to make all decisions regarding policy and maintain control. Additionally, Trujillo
abolished all other opposition political parties and made voting mandatory (Hartlyn 1998, 43).
With no political competition and total control of the military, Trujillo easily won reelections and
remained in power. Actions by Trujillo denigrated democracy.
Controlling information is necessary to maintain an undemocratic regime. Unlimited
access to news sources, media and outside information threatened the survivability and
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legitimacy of the Trujillo regime. The regime rightly assumed if Dominicans were exposed to the
conditions and freedoms of other nations, they would chose to defect and live abroad. A mass
exodus from the Dominican Republic would kill Trujillo's legitimacy both domestically and on
the foreign stage. Therefore, Trujillo restricted incoming information by j amming foreign radio
programs, censoring mail, controlling news media and only a limited number of Dominicans
were able to travel internationally (J lartlyn 1998, 46). Also, phone tapping was not uncommon
and foreign diplomats and journalists were under surveillance (Hartlyn 1998, 46).
Trujillo's rise to power was likely due to the US's policy of nonintervention during the
President Franklin D. Roosevelt ' s Good Neighbor policy. Regardless of Trujillo's status as a
dictator, he understood the importance of good relations with the US. For example, he had forged
good relationships with US military officers and leaders during past US occupations. More
importantly, he also touted a strong anti-communist stance during the Cold War with the Soviet
Union (Hartlyn 1998, 51).
US attitude towards intervening in Latin American countries changed dramatically after
the 1959 Cuban Revolution. Cold War fears in the US were reinforced when Communist leader
Pidel Castro took control of the Cuban government. The possibility of Communism and Soviet
Union power and influence spreading into Latin America was increasing.
International pressure from the US and Organization of American States (OAS) resulted
in economic sanctions against the Dominican Republic> which were instituted after an
assassination attempt on Venezuelan President Romulo Betancourt in 1960 (Black 1986, 28). In
addition, the Dominican Republic was found guilty of human rights violations, which
contributed to the economic sanctions (Hartlyn 1998, 70).
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Trujillo's title as a dictator proved accurate. Public dissent was not tolerated and critics
were murdered or jailed without trial (Herring and Herring 1968, 449). Trujillo's enemies could
not escape his wrath on foreign soil as deaths or disappearances were not uncommon (Herring
and Herring 1968, 449). Trujillo had to be removed from power.
On May 30, 1961, Trujillo was assassinated by eight conspirators while driving outside
of Santo Domingo. The conspirators had allegedly been supplied with weapons from the CIA
(Crandall 2006, 48). Vice-President Joaquin Balaguer immediately became president after the
assassination. The US used the assassination of Trujillo as an opportunity to gain more political
influence in the Dominican Republic. To keep the Trujillo family from gaining power, the US
supported the Balaguer regime.
The Organization of American States (OAS) had a role in working out future elections
following Trujillo's assassination in 1961. The Dominican Republican government set up a
system of electoral boards to administer free elections with impartial personneL The Central
Electoral Board, the highest board consisted of three members and was appointed to serve twelve
year terms (Haggetty 1991, 140). The responsibility of the Central Electoral board was to print
and distribute ballots, equipment and voting materials. All actions were to eliminate the
possibility of fraud.
The 1962 elections were the tirst held after the death of Trujillo and the first democratic
elections since 1924. Democratic elections were held mainly due to the involvement of the US
(Hartlyn, 1998, 78). Multiple opposition patties were active rather than oppressed. Juan Bosch
won a majority with 58.7 percent of the presidential votes, compared to opponent Viriato Fiallo
ofthe National Civic Union (UCN) who only received 30.1 percent (Hartlyn 1998, 78). The U.S.

21

showed their approval by supplying the country with $100 million in financial assistance
allowing the US to influence public policy (Crandall 2005, 51). Despite the free and fair
elections, Bosch was overthrown in a military coup only seven months after assuming the office
of the president.
In April1965, an attempt to bring back Bosch and to place the PRD back to power
erupted in violence. A civilian junta, known as the Triumvirate, had taken control of the country
after the removal of Bosch. Political instability ensued as former military leaders and party
leaders planned to overthrow the Triumvirate. On April 24th, supporters of Bosch, known as
Constitutionalists and civilian pers01mel overtook the National Palace and placed Rafael Molina
Urena as president until the return of Bosch (Haggetiy 33, 1991). Lead by General Elias Wessin
y Wessin, conservative military forces, known as Loyalists attempted to remove the
Constitutionalists from power.
Fearing the possibility of a communist takeover from the members of the
Constitutionalists, US President Lyndon B. Johnson became involved in the violent civil war.
On Apri128 1h claiming that American lives were at stake Johnson deployed over 23,000 U.S.
troops to protect and evacuate American citizens (Crandall 2005, 67). This action was known as
Operation Power Pack.
Perceived by the US as communists, Juan Bosch and the Constitutionalists did not have
the support ofthe US during the civil war (Haggery 1991, 33). Therefore, in the minds ofUS
officials, the retwn of Bosch would inhibit the possibility of a democratic nation. The US
supported the Loyalists and after sixteen weeks of fighting, the Loyalists won.
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An inter-American peacekeeping force (IAPF) was established to keep members of the
Organization of American States (OAS) updated on the situation. To keep the number of
American soldiers at a minimum, 1600 Latin Soldiers from Brazil, Paraguay, Honduras, Costa
Rica and EI Salvador participated in the attempt to stop Constitutionalist from gaining power
(Palmer 1989, 72) . The peace force made Latin American countries part of the decision- making
process and gave the US validation for the intervention.
The decision to intervene was based upon the "loss" of Cuba to con1munism and the fear
of a communist Dominican Republic. President Johnson did not want communism to spread on
his watch and was wilting to take the necessary measures to prevent it. A democratic country
would help alleviate communist fears and prevent another Latin American country from
succumbing to communism.
OAS Ad Hoc Committee met with members of the Constitutionalists and Loyalists to
gain insight for negotiating purposes (Palmer 1989, 88). On August 31 1965, major fighting
ceased as Constitutionalist and Loyalist leaders signed the Acts of Reconciliation and
Institutional act (Greenburg 2003, 5). Under this act Hector Garcia Godoy was placed as
provisional president. To prevent economic instability and promote democratic change, the US
provided emergency financial assistance to the poor, neglected country (Hartlyn 1998, 90).
The 1961 assassination of Dictator Rafael Trujillo created years of political instability in
the Dominican Republic. Juan Bosch, constitutionally elected as president in 1961 was removed
as president during a coup (Cranda11 2006, 49). A countercoup was initiated to restore Bosch to
power. Fearing a possibility of a communist takeover and the return of Bosch, US President
Johnson deployed over 23,000 troops (Crandall 2005, 67). According to Russell Crandall, during
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the administration of President Lyndon B. Johnson there was a concerted effort to use the
Organization of States to promote a political system and a set of leaders in the Dominican
Republic who were supportive of an American model of democracy (Crandall 2006, 79).
Jonathan Hartlyn contends the 1965 U.S. military invasion in the Dominican Republic
had a negative effect on the possibility of democracy in the small nation (Hartlyn 1998, 89).
National security, not democratic promotion, was the \Ulderlying reason to invade the Dominican
Republic (Hartlyn, 1998, 89). 1be United States was more interested in stopping the spread of
communism in American's backyard than promoting democracy. Therefore, a successful
democratic structure was not seen as a priority. Jonathan Hartlyn contends that despite the
attendance of prominent members of the United Nation (U.N.), Organization of American States
(OAS) and U.S. ofti cials, the 1966 elections were neither free nor fair (Hartlyn 1998, 91).
Despite what llartlyn assumed , the US was also interested in creating a democratic system.
Nevertheless, Russell Crandall writes that the U.S. intervention was a key factor in
bringing democracy, albeit flawed, to the nation (Crandall 2006, 94). Although Balaguer ruled in
an autocratic manner, he allowed for a democratic process to evolve and for competitive
elections to occur, despite his partial control of them (Crandall2006, 93). Two consecutive
competitive elections demonstrated that the Dominican Republic were capable of moving
towards a stable democratic nation.
The 1966 elections in the Dominican Republic were the first elections to be held after the
U.S. intervention. Fonner president Juan Bosch and Joaquin Balaguer of the Partido Reforminsta
(PR) party were contenders for the presidential office. US supp01ted Balaguer assumed the office
as president as he was voted into office by winning 57 percent of the vote (Haggerty 1989, 33).
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The US hoped that Balaguer would restore democracy and political stability to the confl ict prone
nation.
Nevertheless, Balaguer ruled in an authoritarian manner where civil rights violations
were rampant. While opposition political parties were legally allowed to operate openly, critical
political opponents and journalists were jailed or killed (Kershaw 2002). Also, Balaguer had
congress alter the 1963 constitution that enhanced presidential powers and removed term limits
on presidential reelections (Hartlyn 1998, 102).
Balaguer dominated the next twelve years as president and then was re-elected to office
in May 1970 with 55.7 percent of t he votes and May 1974 with 85 percent of the vote (Black
1986, 51). Both e lections were largely won with intimidation. For example, although
opposition forces were present during these elections, many refrained from participating due to
harassment from the Balaguer controlled military (llartlyn 1998, 10 1). Additionally, only one
million registered voters bothered to turn out to participate in the voting process (Black 1986,
51).
Soon after the 1970 elections, President Balaguer stated that " a democratic society has to
resort to illegal and arbitrary measures if it is threatened by people seeking to bring about
chaos" (Black 1986, 48). Censorship of the radio was introduced by Balaguer to further control
the information that was broadcastcd. Balaguer also used violence as a method to remain in
power. El Nacional , the Santo Domingo newspaper rep01tcd that there was 186 political
murders and 30 disappearances that occurred in 1970 (Black 1986, 48).
The 1978 presidential elections were an integral part of democracy in Dominican history.
Balagucr•s power was slipping and he faced a viable opponent, millionaire Antonio Guzman of
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the Partido Revolucionario Dominicano (PRO) (Kryzanek 1979, 53). The competition between
the two candidates would dete1mine if free and competitive elections were poss ible in a country
that touted a democratic process, but lacked main democratic rights and freedoms. AJso, the
election outcome would have the power to undermine or strengthen the US's role in present and
future foreign diplomacy.
Election Day was held on May 161h. Guzman had an early lead over Dalaqucr when on
May 1i" military units conducted a raid on the Central Electoral headquarters in the capitol city
of Santo Domingo (Kryzanek 1979, 58). The objective ofthe raid was to confiscate ballot boxes
and prevent the win of Guzman. This action demonstrated that the elections were still susceptible
to tyrannical, military actions.
111

On May 19

,

US President Jinuny Carter validated the US's continued ability to

influence the small nation by promising the withdrawal of US military and economic support
depending on the "integrity" of the election (Kryzanek 1979, 58). President Carter's concern for
human rights created an important change in US foreign policy. The pressure from the US
prompted Balaqucr to a llow the continuation of counting the votes. Guzman received 50 percent
ofthc vote compared to Balaguer's 41 percent (Kryzanek 1979, 58). Election turnout reached a
record high w ith 75 percent of the electorate participating in the election (Kryzanek 1979, 58).
August 16th Guzman was inaugurated as president in a historical peace.tul change of power.
The 1978 elections allowed a new opportunity for democracy to flourish. Guzman
restored civil liberties and basic human rights that were not found during the Trujillo regime
(Black 1986, 54). Nevertheless, President Guzman had many political challenges. For instance,
Balaquer's Reformist Party (PR) had a sixteen- to- eleven majority in the senate, which gave
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them the opportunity to veto any of Guzman's bills (Haggerty 1991, 35). Guzman did not Jinish
his term as he committed suicide in July 1982. Vice-President Jacobo Majluta assumed the
office of presidency for 43 days unti I the May 1982 elections.
The 1982 elections saw the PRD was triumphant again with the nomination of Salvador
Jorge Blanco with 46 percent of the vote. The next viable opponent, Joaquin Balaguer received
36 and former President Juan Bosch only 10 percent. The elections were fair, honest and
competitive (Haggerty 1989, 142). Under Blanco's government, human rights violations and
civil liberties were not violated (Haggerty 1989, 142). The elections were accepted by the
general population and media as legitimate (Furlong, 2011). Democracy continued to thrive as
freedom of press and speech improved under the new administration (Furlong, 2011).
In Latin America, the level of democracy fluctuated from year to year. The Fitzgibbon
Survey of Scholarly Images of Latin America detetmines the democracy rating of countries.
Over the years, the survey requested ten Latin American scholars to rank the countries according
to specific criteria to determine the level of democracy. Some indicators are freedom of press,
free elections and government administration. The democracy ranking is coded as 1 presenting
the strongest democracy and 20 presenting worst democracy.
According to the study, the Dominican Republic was ranked 19 in 1955 during the reign
of Trujillo. Aller the 1965 US intervention the democratic ranking improved to a 14. Democracy
continued to improve as the ranking was an 8 after the 1978 elections. In 2005, the democracy
ranking had remained an 8 (Fitzgibbon 2005).
Freedom House, an online study, provides analytical reports and numerical ratings for
196 countries and territories, which detetmincs their overall freedom, political rights and civil
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liberties. The political rights and civil liberties categories contain ratings between 1 and 7 for
each country or territory, with 1 representing the most free and 7 the least free. The report codes
the cmmtries general freedom as free, partly free or not free.
According to the 2011 Freedom House report, the Dominican Republic's overall freedom
is free, political rights and civil rights are all ranked as 2 out of7. This score indicates that,
although not perfect and slow in taking form, the Dominican Republic was able to maintain
democratic practices instilled after the 1965 US military intervention.
Democracy improved after the 1965 US military intervention as seen by the ability of
Dominican Republic citizens to participate in free and fair elections. For example, the 1978 and
1982 elections in which President Balaguer faced a viable opponent Antonio Guzman. A high
number of constituents were able to participate in the electoral process and freedom of
expression increased as people were not afraid to voice their opinions. The elections allowed
multiple political parties to participate in the campaign and electoral process, which was not
allowed before the intervention.
Since the 1996 elections, the Dominican electoral process has been seen as free and fair
(www.state.gov). Freedom of expression and the availability of alternative sources of
information have continued to increase. As mentioned earlier, Freedom House ranks the current
political and civil rights 2 out 7. One being the highest scores possible and 7 the worst score
possible.

28

Nicaragua
Democracy in Nicaragua struggled under the Somoza and the Sandinista regime. The
Somoza family first obtained power when National Guard commander Anastasio Somoza Garcia
had Augusto C. Sandino assassinated in 1934 {Booth, Wade, and Walker 2006, 71). Somoza and
his two sons, Luis Somoza Debayle and Anastasio Somoza Debayle held power from 1936 until
1979 (Booth, Wade, and Walker 2006, 71 ).
During the Somoza reign of power, the infrastructure for democracy was only found on
paper. To "legitimize" the Somoza regime, elections were held in 1936. Additional elections
were held in 1946, 1951, 1957, 1963, 1967 and 1974 (Jonas and Stein 1990, 17). Although
opposition parties were allowed to campaign, they held no true political influence and were
unable to replace Somoza (Jonas and Stein 1990, 17). Elements of a democracy were
manipulated to keep the Somoza's in power making it extremely difficult for opposition to gain
political success {Tulchin and Walter 1991, 247).
Support from the US helped the Somoza regime maintain power for over four decades by
providing millions of dollars in much needed economic and social aid to the struggling
Nicaraguan economy (Booth, Wade, and Walker 2006, 71). The pro- US and anti-communist
position of the Somoza family helped ensure the continued support of the US during World War
II and the Cold War (Tulchin and Walter 1991, 246).
Many Nicaraguans overlooked the abuse of power because the country was prospering
financially. However, stronger opposition parties gained influence after 1974 when the
Nicaraguan economy quickly weakened and constituents called for government reform (Booth,
Wade, and Walker 2006, 71)
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In 1974, Anastasio Somoza Debayle demonstrated his ability to inflict terror after a

Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) hostage taking incident. Thousands of citizens were
assumed to be Sandinista sympathizers and murdered within a three year period (Booth, Wade
and Walker 2006, 74). The Carter administration pressured Somoza to stop the tetTor and
protests against the regime rose. Repression against citizens increased, which in turn drove
thousands to join the Sandinistas (Booth, Wade and Walker 2006, 75).
Under the Somoza regime freedom of speech was cut off. For example in 1978 Pedro
Joaquin Chamorro, critic and editor of the anti-Somoza newspaper, La Prensa was assassinated
(Moreno 1990, 51). The newspaper was closed down for more than a year during 1986-1987 due
to printing anti-Somoza literature (Booth and Wade 2011, 177). The Carter administration held
to their policy of non- military intervention; deploying troops was not an option for replacing the
infamous Somoza (Moreno 1990, 57). Conditions in Nicaragua were suitable for a revolution.
After gaining power, on July 191h 1979 the Sandinistas, with the support of the public,
were able to overthrow Somoza. To maintain influence with the new government the US
congress approved over $8 million in emergency aid and a long term package of $75 million
(Moreno 1990, 63). New financial loans and emergency relief aid in 1979 to 1981 from U.S.
agencies were also offered to the Sandinistas to extend diplomatic ties and gain influence
(Moreno 1990, 63).
The new Sandinista government promised to replace the Somoza regime with a
participatory democracy and to hold elections before 1985 (Booth, Wade, Walker 76, 2006).
Under the Sandinista government civil and political rights improved. A new Sandinista Police
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Force and Sandinista Popular Army were established, which were used to prevent the abuses of
power.
After taking office in 1981, US President Ronald Reagan viewed the Sandinista
government as detrimental to US national security because of their communist leanings. Despite
the decline of power of the Soviet Union, Reagan was still fearful of communism spreading
throughout Latin America. In an attempt to gain US public and congressional support, Reagan
painted the Sandinistas as a puppet of the Soviet Union and therefore necessary to remove them
from power (Carothers 1991, 96).
Domestic opposition made US military intervention impossible (Cottam 1994, 138).
Therefore, to force the Sandinista's from power, the Reagan administration financially supported
a rebel group known as the Contra's. The Contras were primarily composed of the Nicaraguan
Democratic Forces (FDN) and other smaller factions, such as Miskito Indian groups and the
Democratic Revolutionary Alliance (ARDE) (Carothers 1991, 84). In 1981, Reagan approved a
$19 million of covert assistance to the Contra's. Congress openly approved $24 million of
military assistance in 1984 to the Contra's (Carothers 1991, 85). The CIA also supported the
Contra's with intelligence and training (Carothers 1991, 85). The main objective of the US
intervention was to politically undermine the Sandinista's and remove them from power. US
foreign policy in Nicaragua was designed to remove the perceived threat of the communist
Sandinistas from power by using diplomatic, economic and military pressure (Cottam 1994,
130).

Dming the Contra War, against the US supported Contras, the revolutionary government
felt threatened and suspended many civil rights, including freedom of speech and began
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censoring the news media (Booth, Wade, Walker 83, 2006). Freedom of Religion was generally
free under the revolution, but the government was intolerant of religions that touted antiSandinista rhetoric (Booth, Wade, Walker 83, 2006). However, with an upcoming election most
civil rights were restored in1984 to gain favor with the voting Nicaraguans.
As well as 1inancially supporting the Contra's, the US stopped the Nicaraguans from
receiving loans from the World Bank the Inter- American Development Bank (IDB) and the
International Monetary Ftmd (IMF) (Booth and Wade 2011 , 49). Also, the US reduced the
amount of sugar imported by 90 percent from Nicaragua. These actions economically hurt the
economy, but did not do the damage the US hoped for (Booth and Wade 2011 , 51). Nicaragua
turned towards the Soviet Union for financial assistance and trade.
To rally support from his US constituency, Reagan portrayed the Contras as "freedom
fighters", struggling to bring democracy to the countTy (Carothers 1991, 100). Reagan also
compared them to the US founding fathers and their fi ght fo r independence and democracy
(Carothers 1991, 100).
The Reagan administration's goal in Nicaraguan in 1984 was to promote democracy in
Latin America (Carothers 1991, 97). Promoting democracy provided the US a positive
justification while at the same time attempting to remove the Sandinistas. Reagan claimed the
only way to a democratic outcome was through supporting the Contras (Carothers 199 I , 98).
I have only 3 years left to serve my country; 3 years to carry out the responsibilities you
entrusted to me; 3 years to work for peace. Could there be any greater tragedy than for us
to sit back and permit this cancer to spread, leaving my successor to face far more
agonizing decisions in the years ahead? The freedom fighters seek a political solution.
They arc willing to lay down their arms and negotiate to restore the original goals of the
revolution, a democracy in which the people of Nicaragua choose their own goverrunent.
That is our goal also, but it can only come abo ut if the democratic resistance is able to
bring pressure to bear on those who have seized power.
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Ronald Reagan (www.rcagan.utcxas.cdu)
President Reagan associated Commw1ism to cancer to portray the seriousness of the
situation in N icaragua to the American public. The term Freedom Fighters was important to
describe the Contra's as those who wanted a democratic and fi·ee nation.
Nevertheless, another clear sign of democracy developing was a high level of citizen
involvement and the competition of seven different political parties running for the presidential
position (Booth, Wade, and Walker 2006, 81). Prior to the elections, the opposition parties could
contribute input to the form of government Nicaragua could undertake. Among the components
they wanted were freedom of speech, regular elections, freedom of the press and freedom of
organization and movement (Reding 1985, 556). A remarkable 93 percent of eligible voters
registered and 75 percent of registered voters participated (Jonas and Stein 1990, 19).
Despite US support for the Contra and a trade embargo against the Sandinista
government, Daniel Ortega of the FSLN party won the presidential election with 67 percent of
the vote (Carothers 1991, 89). The next viable opponent, Clemente Guido Chavez of the
Democratic Conservative Party ofNicaragua (PCDN) received only 14 percent of the vote
(Carothers 1991, 89).
The 1984 elections were deemed free and fair by the Latin American Studies Association
(LASA 1984). Not all opposition parties participated in the elections, therefore they were not
fully competitive. US supported Arturo Cruz and the Cordinadora Democratica (CD), believed to
be the strongest opposition party, boycotted the elections due to conditions he deemed unfit for
free and fair elections (Jonas and Stein 1990, 20). The Reagan administration sought to discredit
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the elections and deemed them as meaningless and a "Soviet-style sham" (Jonas and Stein 1990,
20).
The 1984 elections were the tirst elections since the revolution against Somoza and
fulfilled the Sandinista promise of holding elections. The Sandinista goverrunent cancelled
restrictions on the press and granted access to goverrunent owned television and radio (Booth,
Wade, and WaJker 2006, 81). During the elections, the Reagan administration strengthened
efforts to remove the Sandinistas from power. A trade embargo was issued as well as $27 million
in "non-lethal" aid to the Contras (Williams 1990, 19). In October 1985, the Nicaraguan
government reestablished restrictions stating that "restrictions on political liberties were
necessary as long as the revolution was under attack from external forces" (Williams 1990, 19).
T~e

1990 presidential elections were an important step in consolidating democracy in

Nicaragua. Nevertheless, the elections were only allowed by the Sandinista's due to the
diminishing role ofthe Contra's in the civil war and the main agreement to the Arias Peace Plan
( 1987), which called for an end to outside aid for guerrillas and peace taJks (Carothers 1991,
I 04). The US was extensively involved in the election using $2.5 million of US dollars to

strengthen the National Opposition Union (UNO) a group of 14 smaller political parties against
the Sandinistas (LASA 1990, 16).
The 1990 elections saw an increase in voter turnout of 86 percent, compared to 75
percent in 1984 (LASA 1990, 34). The increase can be attributed to a stronger opposition party
and conditions more suitable to free and fair elections. Additionally, opposition parties had
increased television access, the unpopular military draft was revoked and the govemment
granted amnesty to the remaining Sandinista political prisoners (Williams 1990, 22). The
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govermnent allowed official observers from the United Nations and Organization of American
States (OAS) to monitor the elections (Williams 1990, 22). The presence of international
observers would help detect lraud and legitimize the electoral results.
Presidential candidate Violeta Barrios de Chamorro won the elections with 55 percent,
while Daniel Ortega of the FSLN received 39 percent (Booth, Wade, Walker 2006, 86).
Chamorro was the first female to be president in a Latin America country. The deterioration of
the economy, the Contra War and a desire for improved US relations hurt the rc·clcction chances
of Daniel Ortega and the FSLN (LASA 1990, 40). The contra war and US economic sanctions
damaged the Nicaraguan economy and infrastructure.
The 1990 Nicaraguan elections were deemed free and fair by the Latin American Studies
Association and President Daniel Ortega relinquished power peacefully to President elect Violeta
Barrios de Chamorro. Prior to the elections, the news media was able to express a plethora of
political information, providing constituents with access to unbiased material.
The US officially recognized Nicaragua as democratic after the 1990 elections (Booth,
Wade and Walker 2006, 171). During President Chamorro's nearly 7 years in o11ice, Nicaragua
was more democratic, and elections were more competitive (Booth and Wade 2011, 177).
Additionally, the government achieved major progress toward consolidating democratic
institutions, advancing national reconciliation, stabilizing the economy, privatizing state·owned
enterprises, and reducing human rights violations (www.state.gov).
Repressed under the Somoza regime, the media gained valiant strides after the elections
(Booth and Wade 2011, 183). Newspapers, TV and radio stations were able to express different
political views with minimal repercussions from the govenunent. This allowed citizens to gain
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information from a plethora of new sources that were not controlled by the govenunent, allowing
them to form their own opinions.
The 1996 presidential elections were the first post- Contra war and third consecutive
elections since the ovct1hrow of the Somoza regime. The opportunity for opposition parties to
participate continued; nevertheless the elections were primarily between the Liberal Alliance and
Sandinistas (FSLN). Approximately 24 political parties participated; the majority of them under
the Liberal Alliance (LA) led by Presidential candidate Arnoldo Aleman (Close 1999, 175).
Aleman received 51 percent of the vote, while former President Daniel Ortega received
38 percent (Booth, Wade and Walker 2006, 89). Ortega and other presidential candidates
claimed the victory was illegitimate (Booth and Walker 2011, 68).
In January 2000, Aleman and Ortega created a pact that would divide power between the
Liberal Alliance party and Sandinistas, provide legal immunity for current or prior wrong doings
and authorize new electoral reforms that would limit the number of patties that were able to
participate in future elections (Allison 2006, 143). These actions inhibited the democratic
advancements that Nicaragua had made.
In the 2001 presidential elections, Enrique Bolanos ofthe Constitutionalist liberal party
won with 56 percent of the vote compared to Daniel Ortega who received 42 percent (Allison
2006, 143). Former US President Jimmy Carter, with the council of presidents, was there to
observe the campaign and voting process deemed the elections to be free and fair as they had
been in all of the elections from 1990 on.
Shortly after assuming the presidency, Bolanos worked with the National Assembly and
repealed the Aleman- Ortega pact to reduce corruption (Booth, Wade and Walker 2006, 91).
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Aleman was later sentenced to a 20 year jail term on charges of lmmdering $100 million to party
candidates and embezzling$ t .3 million for his own personal use (Booth, Wade and Walker
2006, 91).
According to the Fitzgibbons Survey of Scholarly Images of Latin American study, in
197 5 before the revolution, the overall democratic ranking was 18. In 1991, after the 1990
elections, democracy was ranked as a 10. Nevertheless, the democratic ranking fell to 11 in 1995
and 2000 all the way to 16 in 2005 (Fitzgibbons, 2005). Freedom House indicates that
Nicaragua's overall freedom is partly fi·ee, while political rights and civil liberties are both
ranked 4 out of7 since 2011 (www.freedomhouse.org).
Democratic advances include freedom of press and elections were considered free and
fair. Also, the opportunities for opposition patties to participate in elections were greatly
enhanced and those in power peacefully relinquished power.
Despite the advances democracy in Nicaragua, the country eventually experienced a
reverse wave in democratization and reverted back to a more nondemocratic government. The
Aleman-Ortega pact of 2000 began to reduce democratic advances and by 2006 election with the
Ortega victory the reverse wave became much stronger. Government intimidation and
harassment of journalists have all increased under the Ortega administration making freedom of
speech and press difficult and dangerous (www.state.gov). The Nicaraguan Supreme Court has
allowed 011ega to run for office again, even though the Constitution prohibits a sitting president
from seeking re-election (www.nytimes.com).
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Panama

Democracy in Panama was limited under the authoritarian rule of military regimes from
1968 to 1989. Afier President Anulfo Arias was removed fl'om office for a third time after a coup
in 1968, Lieutenant Colonel Omar Torrijos established a military junta (Furlong 1993, 19). US
Presidents Lyndon B. Johnson, Richard M. Nixon and Gerald Ford supported Torrijos due to his
anti-conununist and pro-US stance. In 1977 US President Jimmy Carter's willingness to
negotiate with Torrijos gave the dictator some legitimacy. Under their leadership, the TorrijosCarter treaty was negotiated and ratified. The treaty scheduled the elimination of the US in the
canal- zone and provided the transfer of the canal to Panama on December 31, 1999 (Sanchez
2007, 153 ). Informally there was an agreement that Torrijos would oversee a transition to
civilian rule (Robinson 1989, 188).
Torrijos stepped down in 1978, turning over power to the Democratic Revolutionary
Party (PRD) that he had created to maintain his ideology, which included nationalism and
national sovereignty (Robinson 1989, 188). Unfortunately, the military remained largely in
power continuing to repress the general population. Under the military dictatorship freedom of
speech and press were curtailed and civil organizations were repressed (Furlong 1993, 20).
The sudden death of General Torrijos in a suspicious plane crash in 1981 created a power
vacuum in Panama that eventually placed General Manuel Noriega as ruler of Panama. Noriega
took control of the Guardia Naeional (the military) and renamed it the Panamanian Defense
f orces (PDF). Noriega had been providing intelligence to the US as an informant since the late
1950's. Despite providing valuable infonnation to the Central Intelligence Agency, Department
of Defense and the US National Security Council, Noriega was working as a double agent
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providing Cuba with intelligence (Meade 2010, 301). Additionally, Noriega was heavily
involved with drug trafficking, prostitution and money laundering (Millet 1988, 51).
General Noriega did not usc terror and human rights violations to maintain his power as
past Latin American dictators had. Instead political opponents were threatened with restriction
on news media, economic pressure and the occasional arrest to install fear into his enemies
(Millet 1988, 51). However, 1985 on he became more repressed and was accused of many
human rights abuses and the murder of some of his political opponents. For example, dissident
Dr. Hugo Spadafora publicly accused Noriega of illegal drug and weapon trafficking. His
decapitated and mutilated body was found stuffed in a US mailbag (Sanchez 2007, 166). This
was a warning to the US and others who were against Noriega.
At the begilming, the Reagan Administration supported Noriega despite his
involvement in electoral fraud and his support of the Contra war in Nicaragua (Meade 2010,
301). Also, Noriega provided intelligence that resulted in the occasional capture of drug
traflickers (Robinson 1989, 190). Although the U.S. had employed Noriega as an intelligence
source, his continued involvement in the international drug trade, and his questionable
involvement in fixing elections and his alleged involvement in the murder of Panamanian
General Omar Torrijos caused the US to reevaluate their relationship with Noriega (Crandall
2005, 189). Additionally, US government officials did not want Noriega to be in control of the
canal when the US transferred all power to the Panamanians on December 31, 1999 (Sanchez
2007, 168). US pride, hegemony and future influence in Panama was at risk.
Two elections were held during the military regimes rule, which were tainted with
violence and fraud. Opposition parties were allowed; nevertheless they held no real voting
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power. In 1984, former President Arnulfo Arias and Manuel Noriega's candidate Nicolas Ardito
Barletta were the two presidential candidates. Initially Arias won the election, but after the
military altered the votes, Barletta was declared the winner and the Revolutionary Democratic
Party (PRD) came to power (furlong 2003, 19). Despite the electoral fraud, the US supported the
new government and increased military and economic aid (Perez 2000, 126).
The Presidential candidate in the 1989 elections was Guillermo Endara of the original
Arnulfo Arias party and his two vice presidential candidates Ricardo Arias Calderon and
Giullermo Ford. Noriega picked Carlos Duque of the Democratic Revolutionary Party (PRD) as
his preferred candidate. Despite excessive fraud, the exit polls conducted by the Catholic Church
and the Carter Center showed Endara received 55.1 percent and 39.5 percent for Duque
(Crandall 2006, 196). Noriega demonstrated his discontent by cancelling the elections and
destroying all official ballots (Furlong 1993, 20). In September 1989, Noriega declared Francisco
Rodriguez, whose name had not appeared on any ballot, as provisional president (Furlong 2003,
20).
The crisis in Panama partially stemmed from the inability of the US to remove General
Manuel Noriega. Noriega was working as a double agent, providing intelligence information to
Cuba and Colombian drug lords as well as to the US. Noriega' s involvement in drug trafficking
and harassment of US military personnel created the opportunity to remove Noriega. Economic
sanctions and covert operations were not effective, which lead to the deployment of20,000 US
troops.
For nearly 2 years, the United States, nations of Latin America and the Caribbean have
worked together to resolve the crisis in Panama The goals of the United States have been
to safeguard the lives of Americans, to defend democracy in Panama, to combat drug
trafficking, and to protect the integrity of the Panama Canal treaty. Many attempts have
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been made to resolve this crisis through diplomacy and negotiations. All were rejected by
the dictator of Panama, General Manuel Noriega, an indicted drug trafficker.
George H.W. Bush (bushlibrary.tamu.edu)
To gain the support of US constituents, President Bush used the protection of American
Iives, democracy and the moral dilemma of drug trafficking to present Noriega as a threat to the
American way of life and national security. Bush claimed that all diplomatic opportunities were
used before deciding to deploy troops and there were no other options available. This
manipulation of the sit uation was used to justify the removal and replacement ofNoriega with
President Guillermo Endara.
On December 16, 1989, a US marine was killed in Panama City. This action, public
knowledge ofNoriega's drug trafficking and years of trying to remove Noriega from power led
to US military intervention on December 20. US President George H.W. Bush ordered 24,000
US military personnel into Panama to protect American citizens, the canal, apprehend Noriega
and promote democracy (Crandall 2005, 172). Known as Operation Just Cause, the large
numbers of US troops easily defeated the Panamanian troops. The US troops were able to
eventually capture Noriega, where he was brought to Miami for drug-trafficking and money
laundering charges (Crandall2005, 206). He completed his sentence in September 2007 and was
then extradited to France where he is currently serving a 10 year prison sentence for money
laundering.
Aller the 1989 US intervention, Endara, Arias Calderon and Ford were declared the
official winners of the 1989 elections and sworn into office in the Panama Canal Zone (Furlong
2000, 34). The new government was faced with the challenge of installing democracy into a
country that had been mled by a military regime for twenty one years. Although the
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administration had won the 1989, they faced legitimacy problems because they were placed in
office by the US military intervention (Sanchez 2007, 174). Additionally, the small nation was
struggling economically after years of economic sanctions imposed upon the US during the
Noriega years (Furlong 1993, 21).
The 1994 and 1999 elections were "the freest and most competitive in the nation's
history" (Perez 2000, 127). The conditions which the 1994 elections were held were significantly
different from. previous elections in Panama. For instance, to reduce the amount of fraud an
independent, nonpartisan Electoral Tribunal supervised the casting of ballots (Scranton 1995,
88). Also, presidential candidates were chosen through primary elections, rather than through
party leadership and a quota laws were instituted which called for a certain percentage of women
to run for political office (Sanchez 2007, 188).
Additionally, the US played a neutral role in the elections compared to previous years
(Scranton 1995, 82). Historically the US had interfered in Panamanian elections to place
candidates in positions that would benefit the US. A new political party entered the political
scene known as Papa Egoro, which was founded and led by Ruben Blades. Overall, there were a
total of 7 presidential candidates and 16 political parties that were able to participate in the 1994
elections (Sanchez 2007, 179). The voters had a plethora of choices at the polls.
An indicator that Panamanian politics was becoming more democratic was the
willingness of incumbent President Guillermo Endara Ernesto to accept defeat and relinquish
power to incoming President Perez Balladares of the PRD in the 1994 elections (Scranton 2000,
113). Historically, leaders have been unwilling to relinquish their positions. This is a strong
indicator that democracy in Panama is increasing.
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After being voted out in the 1989 elections, the Democratic Revolutionary Patty (PRD)
was once again a strong political force during the 1994 elections. The PRD, the party foWlded by
General Torrijos was associated with the military regime. Many people feared that the PRD
would not give up political power once they regained control of the government (Sanchez 2007,

J88). Weak political candidates and platforms acco\Ulted for the PRD victory (Scranton 1995,
74).
The May 1999 elections were also held without interference from the US. The democratic
process was solidified in Panama by holding two free and fair elections consecutively. Tlu·ee
presidential candidates and thirteen political parties were able to participate in the elections.
Martin Torrijos, son of former leader Omar Torrijos and Mireya Moscoso were the top two
presidential candidate contenders. Mireya Moscoso, widow of three time president Arnulfo
Arias won the election with 44.8 percent of the vote, while political rival Martin Torrijos
received 37 percent of the vote (Sanchez 2007, 190). Moscoso was the first female president of
Panama.
The International Foundational for Electoral Systems (IFES) mission declared the
following assessments of 1999 general elections (lFES 1999):
I. The electoral process on May 2, 1999 occurred in peace and tranquility
2. The transfer of materials by the electoral tribWlal was conducted according to
established plans and pennitted voting nationwide to open on time with all necessary
resources on hand.
3. As they cast their votes, in massive numbers from dawn to afternoon, Panamanians
held a "fiesta democratic", marked by high levels of civility and an evident desire to
participate in this exercise of democracy.
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4. The transparence of the process was made possible by the highly professional work
and conduct of persons at every level of the Electoral Tribunal, the Electoral
Attorney's office and among the Corp of Electoral Delegates. Also notable was the
extensive participation of Panamanian youth, who assumed the duty of statling
polling places to enable others to vote, as well as exercising their own right to vote.
Equally important and noteworthy was the patticipation of Panamanian women as
poll workers and poll watchers.
5. Tolerance, harmony and respect were the salient characteristics displayed by the
political parties during the election; these attitudes facilitated the success of the
electoral process.
6. The continuing work of the Justice and Peace Commission in Panama's electoral
process, as observers and through various Ethical Pacts, promoted and provided
higher levels of tolerance and mutual respect among the actors in Panamanian
politics.
7.

The role of the media of communication played a determining factor for promoting
transparency of the electoral process.

According to the Fitzgibbon Survey of Scholarly Images of Latin America, during the
reign ofTonijos in 1970, the democratic ranking was an 11. After the 1989 elections, the
democratic ranking raised to 15, with 20 being the worst democratic score. Democracy
improved in 2005, the democratic ranking was a 7 (Fitzgibbons, 2005).
Freedom House 2011 ranks the overall freedom of Panama as a free, while political rights
is a 1 and civil liberties are a 2 (treedomhouse.org). These scores indicate that Panama was able
to maintain its democratic govenunent despite many struggles to implement a democracy.
For twenty one years, 1968 to 1989, democracy was severely limited under the rule of the
military. Only two presidential elections were held, in which Panamanians were tmable to fully
participate. After the 1989 intervention, Panama has held four free and fair elections.
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Additionally new political parties emerged and freedom of speech and press improved as
political opponents were able to express themselves without fear of retribution. President
Endaras willingness to accept defeat and relinquish power to incoming President Balladares,
indicated that democracy was prospering.

Conclusion
Democracy promotion in Latin America is a controversial topic in the foreign policy
field. There is a continuing debate among scholars and public officials whether or not US
military intervention can result in democracy promotion. Based upon my research, I conclude
my hypothesis that military intervention and coercive diplomacy can result in democracy
promotion is correct.
Before the US military intervention in 1965, free and fair elections) freedom of
expression and alternatives forms of information were all repressed under the rule of Dominican
Republic President Rafael Tntiillo. After the assassination of Trujillo, Democracy continued to
struggle under the rule of Joaquin Balaguer. It wasn't until the 1978 elections that democracy
was able to nourish. President Antonio Guzman restored many civil liberties and basic human
rights that were absent under Trujillo and Balaguer. After the 1982 elections, essential elements
to democracy such as freedom of speech and press improved under the Jorge Blanco
administration.
Since 1996) regular competitive elections in the Dominican Republic have been held in
which opposition candidates have been elected as president. Freedom of speech continues to
improve as there are five national newspapers and there are more than 300 private radio stations
and 40 television stations (www.freedomhouse.org).
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Indirect US intervention, such as supporting the Contras and economically pressuring
the Sandinistas, was implemented to force the Sandinistas from power. Democracy was
solidified under the administration of President Violeta Barrios de Chamorro. Following the
elections, President Daniel Ortega peacefully relinquished power to Chamorro. Under the
Somoza regime, freedom ofthe press was repressed. ALler 1990, the news media gained valiant
strides as newspapers, TV stations and the radio were able to express many different political
v1ews.
Despite the democratic progress in Nicaragua, many other problems still exist. As
mentioned earlier, Nicaragua has suffered from a reverse wave of democratization under the
2006 election of President Daniel Ortega. Electoral fraud has been present in the 2008 municipal
elections and the democracy that was achieved has been overshadowed by high levels of poverty,
unemployment, crime and violence. Currently, Daniel 01tega has sought to build closer ties with
Iran, Russia, and Venezuela (www.state.gov). These relationships could further damage the
relationship with the US, as Russia and Iran and have access to nuclear weapons and Venezuela
dictator Hugo Chavez has a vehement hatred towards the US.
From 1968 to 1989 democracy in Panama struggled under the reign of military
dictatorships. Under the military dictatorships of Omar Torrijos and Manuel Noriega, freedom of
speech and press were curtailed and civil organizations were repressed. Also, only two
presidential elections were held during this time. Both elections were tainted with fi:aud and
corruption and were held only to help legitimize the leadership.
After the 1989 US military intervention, the unofficial winners of the 1989 elections
Guillermo Endara and his two vice presidential candidates Ricardo Arias Calderon and
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Giullermo Ford were placed into office by US officials. Democratic practices greatly improved
as the 1994 and 1999 elections were "the freest and most competitive in the nation's history"
(Perez 2000, 127). In a historic election, President Endara peacefully transferred power to the
winner of the 1999 election. Freedom of speech and press continue to improve as there are
around 100 private and radio stations and several TV networks (www.:fr·eedomhouse.org).
Through my research, I discovered that the success of democracy is dependent upon the
leaders of a nation who must be fully committed in seeing democracy flourish. Effective
democratic leaders are more concerned with the general well- being of the constituents and not
increasing their own political power and influence. A good example of a leader not supporting
democracy is Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega.
I also discovered that economics can play an important role in the degree of democracy.
During the Contra War in Nicaragua, the termination of foreign aid and loans had a negative
effect on the agricultural system and overall economy. While the economy is suffering, the
promotion of democracy is often overlooked.
Additionally, different cultures can have an eiiect on the promotion of democracy. Every
nation has a unique cultural background. Therefore, democracy should not be based upon the US
political system, but should be established for that particular country.
There is no telling if the democratic advances in the Dominican Republic, Panama and
Nicaragua are solely based upon the intervention ofthc US. There is a possibility that the
advances would have been made without military intervention or coercive diplomacy of the US.
Therefore, further research should be conducted to determine if there are more variables that can
influence democracy promotion in Latin America.
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